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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three years, there has been a highly publicized and ongoing 
struggle in New Jersey: the state legislators have been fighting to legalize 
sports betting, yet the Third Circuit Federal Courts have continuously stopped 
these legislators cold in their tracks.1 The federal court has struck down 
multiple New Jersey constitutional amendments because the court holds these 
amendments are in violation of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act (hereinafter, “PASPA”).2 PASPA, passed in 1992, is the federal statute that 
all but completely outlawed sports gambling.3 However, four states—Nevada, 
Delaware, Montana, and Oregon—are still able to legally generate revenue 
from sports gambling4 because of grandfather provisions in PASPA.5 Further, 
out of the four states, only Nevada was entitled to operate a full state-sponsored 
sports wagering scheme.6 The other states, however, were only allowed to 
implement the sports betting schemes they already had in existence—this 
meant that Delaware, Montana, and Oregon were only allowed to implement 
                                                            
* I would like to thank primarily the love of my life, Chantel, and my family for 
supporting me in everything I do as well as understanding the work that is required 
for this note. I also want to express my gratitude to the UNLV Gaming Law Journal 
Staff for, without them, this work would not be possible.  
1  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, (Christie I Dist. Ct.) 926 F. Supp. 
2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J. 
(Christie I), 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
v. Governor of N.J. (Christie II), 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (decision vacated 
2015). 
2  28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2016). 
3  Id. 
4  Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA): 
A Bad Bet for the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281, 287–88 (2011). 
5  Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a) (2016). 
6  Meer, supra note 4 at 288. 
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limited sports wagering in the form of lotteries because those states did not 
previously allow for a full sports wagering scheme.7 Additionally, PASPA did 
allow an exception for New Jersey if the state enacted a sports gambling 
scheme within one year after the effective date of PASPA.8 However, New 
Jersey failed to do so,9 leaving Nevada in sole possession of the only fully 
functional legalized sports betting system in the country.10 This monopoly is 
the only legal game in town concerning the United States sports betting market, 
where illegal sports betting is estimated to be worth somewhere between $80 
and $380 billion annually.11 
While PASPA may explicitly prohibit legal sports betting in New Jersey, it 
is unclear whether this law will stay on the books forever. Some critics of 
PASPA have argued that the law is unconstitutional12 or that the legalization of 
sports betting is a zone of experimentation solely for the states.13 Other critics 
have argued that PASPA is now outdated and should be repealed.14 
Additionally, critics suggest that PASPA is not accomplishing what it set out to 
do, as a recent 2015 study showed that people wager $95 billion on football 
games alone, with only $2 billion being wagered legally.15 Critics also argue 
that public policy favors PASPA’s demise. These arguments include how 
legalizing sports betting will provide a new form of taxable income to 
governments, how there will be more state regulation of a prominent illegal 
                                                            
7  Id. at 288–89. Oregon has given up its right to operate a sports lottery in order to 
host NCAA tournament games and Montana has similarly ceased its sports 
lottery—thus only Delaware and Nevada remain as states with any form of 
legalized sports wagering. 
8  Id. at 289. 
9   Id.; a debate between legislators ultimately prevented New Jersey from 
implementing legislation during this one-year period. Joseph F. Sullivan, Gambling 
Debate Rages Anew Over Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/20/nyregion/gambling-debate-rages-anew-over-
sports.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
10  Meer, supra note 4, at 288. 
11   NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, 2–14 (1999), http://govinfo. 
library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/2.pdf. 
12  See Thomas L. Skinner III, Note, The Pendulum Swings: Commerce Clause and 
Tenth Amendment Challenges to PASPA, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 311, 342 (2011). 
13  See Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Note, Betting Against the House (and Senate): The 
Case for Legal, State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY. 
L.J. 163, 170 (2010–2011). 
14  See Meer, supra note 4, at 308–09; see also Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are Off: 
Revisiting the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 591, 594–95 (2013); Jason Goldstein, Note, Take 
the Money Line: PASPA, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Integrity of the Game, 11 
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 362, 375–76 (2012). 
15  Thomas Barrabi, Legalized Sports Gambling? Americans To Bet $95 Billion On 
NFL, College Football This Season, Mostly Illegally, Group Says, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ legalized-sports-
gambling-americans-bet-95-billion-nfl-college-football-season-mostly-2089606. 
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activity, and how legalizing sports betting will create even higher fan interest, 
boosting revenue for sporting leagues such as the National Basketball 
Association (hereinafter, “NBA”).16 Further, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed to vacate its latest August 25, 2015 
decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter, “NCAA”) v. 
Governor of New Jersey and re-hear oral arguments en banc.17 The rare 
occurrence of vacating an already published opinion shows that New Jersey’s 
(as well as other states’) hopes of legalizing sports gambling may still be alive 
and well.18 
With the wide social outcry against PASPA, it will unlikely remain good 
law forever, and until the United States Supreme Court rules on the debate 
regarding the issues, speculation is necessary.19 Therefore, this note will 
discuss the potential ramifications for Nevada if Congress were to repeal 
PASPA or if the Supreme Court would declare PASPA unconstitutional today. 
This note will divide its analysis into three parts. Part I will examine why 
Congress enacted PASPA, why PASPA likely no longer is accomplishing its 
purpose, and why Congress is likely to repeal it. Part I will also analyze some 
of the more persuasive arguments regarding PASPA’s constitutionality, giving 
reasons why the Supreme Court may declare PASPA unconstitutional when it 
inevitably grants certiorari. 
Part II begins with a brief history of the New Jersey arguments that have 
yet to succeed in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the case line of 
NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey. Part II will then explain why New Jersey is 
so adamant about trying to legalize sports betting. Finally, Part II will delve 
into the aspects surrounding New Jersey’s economic decline, specifically in 
Atlantic City, and the major reasons underlying the decline.20 
Part III analyzes what the potential ramifications may be in Nevada if 
sports betting were to become legal nationwide. This analysis will primarily 
come from a comparison between Nevada’s current monopoly in the sports 
betting world and New Jersey’s past monopoly in gambling in the Northeast. 
Part III will then identify the differences between Nevada and New Jersey and 
explain why this author believes Nevada will see a decline in revenue 
                                                            
16  Ian Thomsen, Weekly Countdown: Stern Open to Legalized Betting, Rule 
Changes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.si.com/more-
sports/2009/12/11/weekly-countdown. 
17  Joe Drape, Appeals Court to Rehear New Jersey Sports Betting Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/sports/appeals-court-
to-rehear-new-jersey-sports-betting-case.html?ref=topics&_r=0; see Christie II 799 
F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated. 
18  Drape, supra note 17. 
19   It must be noted that the Supreme Court did have an opportunity to grant 
certiorari in Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), but declined to do so. Christie 
v. Governor of N.J., 134 S.Ct. 2866 (2014). However, with the new Christie II, 799 
F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), the Supreme Court may grant certiorari in the future. 
20  See infra Section II.B. 
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stemming from sports betting. 
I. OVERVIEW OF PASPA AND THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST IT 
A. Legislative History 
In 1992, Congress passed PASPA, which states: 
It shall be unlawful for. . .a governmental entity. . .or a person to sponsor, 
operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law of compact of a 
governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or 
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical 
references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur 
or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or 
more performances of such athletes in such games.21 
Ironically enough, one of the bill’s primary sponsors was a Senator from 
New Jersey, Bill Bradley.22 The legislative history of PASPA shows that a 
primary reason behind enacting PASPA was to “stop the spread of state-
sponsored sports gambling and to maintain the integrity of our national 
pastime,” with national pastime referring to all amateur and professional 
sports.23 The fear of sporting events losing integrity is not unfounded. For 
example, in 1989, three years prior to the enactment of PASPA, reports 
surfaced alleging that Pete Rose,24 manager of the Cincinnati Reds at the time, 
had gambled on baseball games.25 After the allegations, Major League Baseball 
(hereinafter, “MLB”) had hired an independent investigator who discovered 
evidence revealing that Pete Rose did in fact bet on baseball games.26 In August 
of 1989, MLB Commissioner Bart Giamatti suspended Pete Rose for life, 
making him only the fifteenth player in baseball history to receive a lifetime 
ban.27 
On February 22, 1991, only a year and a half later, the Senate introduced 
Bill 474,28 which would eventually become PASPA. The most notable 
proponents of the Bill included league commissioners from all four of the 
                                                            
21  28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2016). 
22   S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991); FSB Assoc., BILL BRADLEY, 
http://www.billbradley.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
23  S. REP. NO. 102-248 at 4. 
24   Pete Rose Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY (Oct. 5, 2016, 4:43PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/07/us/pete-rose-fast-facts/ (as of October 5, 2016, 
Pete Rose holds the Major League Baseball Record for the most games played and 
the most hits in a career). 
25   Pete Rose, THE BIOGRAPHY.COM http://www.biography.com/people/pete-rose-
39483 (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
26  Id. 
27   Pete Rose Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY, Supra note 24. For a further glimpse into 
the life of Pete Rose, see PETE ROSE, MY PRISON WITHOUT BARS (2004). 
28  S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991). 
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major sports in America.29 During the subcommittee process, the National 
Football League (hereinafter, “NFL”) commissioner at the time, Paul 
Tagliabue, testified, “Sports gambling threatens the character of team 
sports. . ..[W]ith legalized sports gambling, our games instead will come to 
represent the fast buck,” and the games “would change forever—and for the 
worse.”30 Not only did the NFL commissioner testify, but also the 
commissioners of the NBA, MLB, and the general counsel and vice president 
of the National Hockey League (hereinafter, “NHL”) all testified to the 
negative ramifications of sports gambling.31 This testimony, coupled with the 
recent Pete Rose scandal, led Congress to adopt PASPA, stating, “Sports 
gambling threatens the integrity of, and public confidence in, amateur and 
professional sports. Widespread legalization of sports gambling would 
inevitably promote suspicion about controversial plays and lead fans to think 
‘the fix was in’ whenever their team failed to beat the point spread.”32 
While the integrity of professional sports was the primary concern behind 
PASPA, it was not the only driving force behind the legislation. When 
Congress held congressional hearings on PASPA, thirteen states were 
considering legalized sports gambling.33 Because of the pending consideration 
of the states concerning sports-gambling legalization, Congress (pressured by 
the major sports commissioners) felt that if it did not act proactively, it would 
be impossible to undo the damages retroactively.34 Congress stated that the 
states could not adequately protect the country from the moral harms 
underlying sports gambling and that federal intervention was necessary.35 
One of the major moral harms concerning states was that they could not 
prevent the spread of gambling among the Nation’s youth.36 Congress 
identified that young people in America love sports, and stated that allowing 
nationwide sports gambling would diminish the values that sports instill in 
America’s youth.37 Congress further noted, during the discussion of PASPA, 
that Minnesota proposed allowing people to play the state lottery through video 
game systems from home.38 Moreover, this new system of gambling would 
force children to associate gambling with things that children love, such as 
videogames.39 Congress also cited statistics, stating that of the approximately 8 
                                                            
29   Id. 
30  Id. at 4. 
31  Id. at 3. 
32  Id. at 5. 
33   Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—Policy 
Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 8 (1992). 
34  See S. REP. NO. 102-248 at 5 (1991). 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39   Id. (citing Eben Shapiro, Nintendo ad Minnesota Set a Living-Room Lottery 
WYANT FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/17  2:23 PM 
228 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:223 
million problem gamblers in America in 1991, 1 million of them were under 
the age of 20.40 
However, PASPA was not without its critics during the legislative hearing 
process. The Department of Justice (hereinafter, “DOJ”) was one of the 
strongest opponents against PASPA.41 The DOJ was concerned about PASPA’s 
constitutionality because PASPA intruded into “determinations of how to raise 
revenue,” an area typically left to the states.42 The DOJ was also concerned 
with federalism issues,43 as PASPA’s language states: 
A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be commenced in an 
appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney General of the 
United States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports 
organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such 
violation.44 
This language specifically allows a sports league, such as the MLB or 
NFL, to sue any state trying to enact a law that legalizes sports betting. The 
DOJ found this provision of PASPA “particularly troubling [because it] would 
permit enforcement. . .by sports leagues.”45 This section of PASPA reveals 
potential constitutional issues of standing.46 
Another opponent of Bill 474 was Senator Chuck Grassley.47 Senator 
Grassley raised many of the same arguments that the DOJ did;48 however, 
Senator Grassley also made a significant public policy argument concerning 
one of the major criticisms of PASPA.49 The Senator argued that while “sports 
gambling is a national problem and. . .the moral erosion it produces cannot be 
limited geographically,” this reasoning can be applied to “any form of wagering 
many other state revenue raising programs”; and Congress should not tell the 
states how to raise revenue.50 The Senator makes a fair point, correctly 
observing that since PASPA allows grandfather exemptions for states where 
gambling was already authorized by a state statute, PASPA does not actually 
                                                            
Test, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/27/ 
business/nintendo-and-minnesota-set-a-living-room-lottery-
test.html?pagewanted=all). 
40  S. REP. NO. 102-248 at 5 (1991). The legislative history did not cite the source 
of these statistics. See id. 
41  James C. W. Goodall, Note, Bringing Down the House: An Examination of the 
Law and Policy Underpinning the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
of 1992, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2015). 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2016) (emphasis added). 
45  S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13 (1991). 
46  See infra Part II.A (addressing more issues raised by challengers to PASPA). 
47  Goodall, supra note 41, at 1108–09. 
48  Id. at 1109. 
49  Goodall, supra note 41, at 1109; S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12. 
50  S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12 (1991). 
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prohibit the evils of sports gambling, but rather restricts the evils to small 
geographical areas of the country.51 Senator Grassley was also concerned that 
these grandfather exemptions would result in discrimination between the states, 
giving favorable treatment to states such as Nevada while prohibiting other 
states from engaging in the same conduct, and that these distinctions were 
irrationally assigned.52 Furthermore, PASPA could establish precedent for the 
Federal Government to prohibit any state revenue program with Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power.53 
Despite the DOJ’s opposition coupled with Senator Grassley’s and other 
legislators’ concerns, Congress still decided PASPA was necessary.54 Because 
of the recent baseball betting scandal by Pete Rose, as well as previous scandals 
within professional and amateur sports relating to sports betting,55 members in 
Congress felt that the harm caused by legalizing nationwide sports betting—the 
purpose behind passing the Bill—outweighed the financial benefits that the 
states sought from legalization.56 Therefore, on October 28, 1992, President 
George H. W. Bush signed PASPA into law.57 
B. PASPA has Failed to Accomplish the Purposes Behind its Enactment 
To review, the legislative history shows that there were three primary 
purposes behind PASPA’s enactment. Those three purposes are to stop the 
spread of sports gambling, to maintain the integrity of sports, and to reduce the 
likelihood of America’s youth gambling.58 Many critics have argued that 
PASPA has not actually achieved these three goals, despite being in existence 
for almost twenty-five years now.59 
                                                            
51  28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2016); S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13. 
52   S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13 (claiming Delaware should not be included as a 
grandfathered state because it was not “conducting any form of sports wagering and 
[had] not done so for the last fifteen (15) years”). 
53  Id. at 12. 
54  See generally id.; 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2016). 
55   See Pete Rose, THE BIOGRAPHY.COM, supra note 25; See generally Douglas 
Linder, The Black Sox Trial: An Account, FAMOUS TRIALS (2010), 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/blacksox/ blacksoxaccount.html 
(indicating that while Pete Rose’s ban from baseball regarding sports betting was 
likely the most significant scandal underlying PASPA’s enactment, it was not the 
first time players had affected baseball’s reputation due to involvement in sports 
wagering; the most famous example is the Chicago “Black Sox” scandal which 
involved eight players on the 1919 Chicago White Sox accepting bribes from sports 
bettors to lose the World Series on purpose). 
56  S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12 (1991). 
57   W. Dane Carey, Comment, Two Lessons of Anticommandeering: The 
Preemptive Significance of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 11 
WILLIAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 3 (2013). 
58  S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–5. 
59   Meer, supra note 4, at 293–98; Goodall, supra note 41, at 1133–35; see Is 
Legalizing Sports Gambling a Mad Idea?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 21, 2015, 6:48 
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1. Since the Enactment of PASPA, Sports Betting Popularity Has 
Increased, Including Illegal Sports Betting 
Regarding the spread of sports gambling, it seems that sports gambling has 
only grown in popularity since PASPA’s enactment in 1992. Despite Nevada 
having a monopoly as the only state authorized to participate in wholesale legal 
sports betting, nationwide newspapers now present gambling advice and betting 
lines.60 Americans bet billions of dollars during March Madness, the term 
commonly used to refer to the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament.61 
Moreover, while most people know this tournament is one of the biggest draws 
for sports betting,62 President Obama has put out his “picks” for which team he 
believes will win each game for the past several years.63 While the President is 
not explicitly promoting sports betting, it has been estimated that more people 
fill out brackets than vote in an election; as the President and CEO of the 
American Gaming Association stated, “[I]t’s clear that Americans embrace 
gaming.”64 Since 1991, there has been evidence of an increase in sports betting, 
rather than the decrease PASPA desired: bets on the Super Bowl in Nevada 
alone have increased by nearly $80 million dollars.65 
Further, illegal sports betting is now prevalent in the United States; 
according to CNBC, people illegally bet between $60–70 billion annually on 
college football.66 The FBI approximates that over $2.5 billion dollars is 
                                                            
PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/amid-madness-college-basketball-brackets-
push-legalize-sports-betting/. 
60  Woo, supra note 14, 589 (indicating that many of the major newspapers in the 
country, such as USA Today and the New York Post offer betting lines in the sports 
section of the newspapers). 
61  Jonathan Marino, Americans Will Drop $9 Billion Betting on March Madness, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 13, 2015, 11:52 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
ncaa-tournament-gambling-projection-2015-3. 
62  Id. 
63   President Obama: Cats Wear Crown, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-
basketball/tournament/2015/story/_/id/12505909/president-barack-obama-bracket-
picks-kentucky-ncaa-men-basketball-title; President Obama Picks Spartans, ESPN 
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/2014/ 
story/_/id/10630406/louisville-michigan-st-arizona-florida-president-barack-
obama-final-four. 
64  David Purdum, Estimated 40 Million Fill out Brackets, ESPN (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/12465741/estimated-70-million-brackets-9-
million-bets-ncaa-tournament. 
65  Jack Jones, Amount Bet on the Super Bowl, BETFIRM.COM (Feb. 3, 2015), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150502070522/http://www.betfirm.com/amount-
bet-on-the-super-bowl/. 
66  Gillian Spear, Think Sports Gambling Isn’t Big Money? Wanna Bet?, NBC 
NEWS (July 15, 2013, 4:16 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/think-
sports-gambling-isnt-big-money-wanna-bet-f6C10634316. 
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wagered illegally during March Madness, while legal sports books in Nevada 
only bring in between $80–90 million during those same three weeks.67 In other 
words, legal sports betting during March Madness takes in less than 4% of the 
illegal take.68 Because sports betting, especially illegal sports betting, is so 
popular in America today, it seems PASPA has fallen short in accomplishing 
the first of three purposes behind its enactment. 
2. PASPA Has Little to No Effect on Cutting Down Incidents Affecting the 
Integrity of Sports 
Since PASPA’s enactment in 1992, there have been multiple incidents 
involving not only collegiate sports betting scandals, but also professional 
sports betting scandals, both of which reveal that PASPA is not living up to 
another one of its intended purposes. 
Regarding collegiate sports betting scandals after PASPA’s enactment, 19 
athletes from the University of Maine’s basketball and football teams received 
suspensions in 1992 for participating in a gambling operation that raked in 
$3,000 to $10,000 per week.69 In 1995, a jury convicted a former student at the 
University of Central Florida of attempting to bribe basketball players at the 
college to ensure that the team would lose by enough points to cover the betting 
spread.70 The student offered $15,000 in bribes;71 however, the University of 
Central Florida players insisted that they never actually took the money and 
that they did not alter their play based on any bribe.72 
One of the most glaring stains on the integrity of collegiate sporting events 
occurred in 1994, two years after PASPA’s enactment, in the Arizona State 
point-shaving scandal.73 The scandal involved two basketball players at 
Arizona State conspiring to shave points,74 if needed, in order to win a bet they 
placed on their own game against Oregon State.75 This scandal was especially 
heinous because it was unlike the other collegiate sports betting scandals 
                                                            
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  COLLEGES; Maine Hit by Gambling Scandal h, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1992/04/19/sports/colleges-maine-hit-by-gambling-
scandal-h.html. 
70  Warren Richey, Man Who Tried To Fix College Game Avoids Jail, SUN 
SENTINEL (Nov. 4, 1995), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1995-11-
04/news/9511040043_1_kelly-hunter-game-prosecutors. 
71  Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Throwing the Game, TIME (Sept. 17, 
2000), http://content.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,55103,00.html. 
72  Richey, supra note 70. 
73  Point-Shaving Scandal Hits Arizona State, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1997), 
http://articles.latimes.com/ 1997/dec/06/sports/sp-61336. 
74  Shaving points is the act of a team or player deliberately missing an opportunity 
to score in order to make sure that the spread of a game is not covered and therefore 
controlling the outcome of a placed bet. See Id. 
75  Id. 
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already mentioned in this article; most other betting scandals involved players 
betting on games that were not their own or rejecting bribes from third parties. 
The two players involved admitted to fixing four games in 1994, and they 
admitted to taking bribes to fix these four games.76 
Another collegiate sports gambling scandal that negatively affected the 
integrity of sports was the indictment of two former Northwestern basketball 
players who took money to fix games and shave points in 1994–1995.77 A jury 
would later convict those two Northwestern basketball players of rigging the 
games.78 Northwestern was later involved in another gambling scandal when 
four football players plead guilty to perjury after previously denying any 
involvement in fixing football games when prosecutors had questioned them.79 
Countless other collegiate sports betting scandals have occurred since PASPA 
was passed, including the most recent scandal when a Boston University 
hockey player received suspension in 2015 for participating in gambling 
activities.80 
Moreover, PASPA has failed to uphold public confidence in the integrity 
of sporting events in the professional setting as well. Professional tennis has 
seen many scandals involving match fixing, including a 2007 match involving 
Nikolay Davydenko and Martin Vassallo Arguello.81 In a relatively minor 
tennis match between these two, bettors wagered more than $7 million in favor 
of Arguello, an extreme underdog unlikely to win.82 That $7 million was more 
than ten times the amount usually wagered on similar low-profile matches.83 It 
was so unusual that the largest Internet wagering company, Betfair, actually 
removed the match from bettors and voided all bets placed on the match.84 This 
was a first for Betfair, a company that had been accepting wagers for seven 
years.85 And professional match fixing still occurs: another professional tennis 
scandal surfaced as recently as 2015 when two players, Walter Trusendi and 
Elie Rousset, admitted they fixed matches in 2014.86 
                                                            
76  Id. 
77  Pam Belluck, COLLEGE BASKETBALL; Ex-Northwestern Players Charged in 
Point-Shaving, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/27/ 
sports/college-basketball-ex-northwestern-players-charged-in-point-shaving.html. 
78  Barlett & Steele, supra note 71. 
79  Id. 
80  Mike McMahon & Adam Wodon, BU’s Roberto Suspended for Gambling 
Activity, COLLEGE HOCKEY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.collegehockeynews. 
com/news/2015/12/21_bus_roberto_suspended_for.php. 
81  Greg Garber, Suspicions Follow Davydenko Heading to U.S. Open, ESPN (Aug. 
23, 2007, 4:52 PM), http://espn.go.com/sports/tennis/news/story?id=2984805. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Regina Avalos, Tennis Player Match Fixing Scandal: Players Banned for Six 
Months, INQUISITR (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.inquisitr.com/1954354/tennis-
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Tennis is not the only professional sport that has experienced illegal betting 
since PASPA. The NBA’s integrity came into question in 2007 when NBA 
referee Tim Donaghy plead guilty to betting on NBA games he officiated.87 
Not only did he bet on games himself, but he also was involved in an ongoing 
gambling ring involving other organized crime members.88 Donaghy would 
feed inside information to his co-conspirators regarding the teams and 
players.89 Those organized crime members initially paid Donaghy $2,000 for 
every game in which Donaghy correctly picked the winner, and eventually paid 
him $5,000 per game due to his accuracy.90 This scandal led then-
commissioner David Stern, an early proponent of PASPA, to take a step back 
and state in a 2009 interview that legalized gambling may not be as bad as 
previously suggested.91 Stern further stated that gambling might not be as 
immoral as previously anticipated.92 
Incidents of match fixing and illegal gambling at both collegiate and 
professional level sports show that the bottom line is this: the public will 
always question the integrity of sporting events. Donaghy, Davydenko, or any 
of the college players mentioned above would likely have participated in these 
incidents regardless of whether sports betting was legal. In other words, the fact 
that sports betting was illegal did not stop them from violating the integrity of a 
game, showing that PASPA has fallen short of reaching one of its main 
objectives. Further, the integrity of a game is not only affected by sports 
betting; other issues, such as athletes taking performance enhancing drugs, 
seem to threaten games more and more each day.93 Therefore, PASPA seems 
ineffective in achieving its second objective to maintain the integrity of 
sporting events and likely will be short-lived in the future. 
3. PASPA Has Failed to Control the Promotion of Sports Gambling Among 
the Youth of America 
The final and most noble reason behind ratifying PASPA was to decrease 
the likelihood of youth gambling in America.94 Since 1992, however, youth 
gambling has increased, showing that PASPA has failed at yet another purpose 
behind its enactment. First, it is impossible for PASPA to completely to stop 
youth sports gambling because there are many avenues for young people to use 
                                                            
player-match-fixing-scandal-players-banned-for-six-months/. 
87  Ex-NBA Ref Pleads Guilty in Betting Scandal, CNN (Aug. 16, 2007), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/ US/law/08/15/nba.ref/index.html?iref=topnews. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Meer, supra note 4, at 296–97. 
92  Id. at 297. 
93  Id. 
94  See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–5. 
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in order to gamble on sports illegally.95 Since 1992, Internet use has exploded 
within the American population, with children between the ages of 8 and 18 
logging seven hours online each day.96 While PASPA proponents could not 
have predicted the future in 1992, it is clear that the new avenues available to 
minors allow them unprecedented and typically unfettered access to multiple 
illegal activities, including sports betting. 
Further, while statistics regarding youth gambling are scarce, the few 
studies done surrounding American youth gambling show an increase in 
gambling since 1992, rather than the decrease that PASPA longingly sought.97 
In fact, “regional surveys suggest that more than 30% of all high school 
students gamble periodically.”98 Current gambling among America’s youth has 
escalated to the point that some middle schools are now starting to have their 
own illegal betting rings.99 Further, the expansion of new technology, such as 
the Internet and lottery ticket vending machines, only contribute to increased 
adolescent gambling.100 
While current gambling rates among America’s youth may be informative, 
only by observing a comparison of post- and pre-PASPA gambling rates can 
PASPA’s failure be truly appreciated. One study published by the National 
Center for Responsible Gaming shows that from 1992 to 1998, the percentage 
of 9th grade boys who frequently gambled increased from 21.8% to 22.9%.101 
While this increase may not seem that drastic, frequent gambling among 12th 
grade boys from 1992 to 1998 went up from 23.8% to 29%.102 Moreover, the 
same study summarizes the answer to the question “are youths gambling more, 
less, or about the same?” by proving that from 1992–1995 gambling stayed at a 
constant level with a slight increase in gambling habits among certain 
youths.103 Remember: PASPA’s goal was to decrease the likelihood of 
America’s youth gambling, not keep it at a consistent level. 
A pamphlet from California is also ripe with evidence that gambling has 
                                                            
95  Meer, supra note 4, at 297–98. 
96  Id. (citing Tamar Lewin, If Your Kids Are Awake, They’re Probably Online, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at A1). 
97  Francie Grace, Kids Gambling – and Losing, CBS NEWS (July 14, 2003, 5:58 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ news/kids-gambling-and-losing/; Randy 
Stinchfield, Gender, Age Are Most Important Clues for Teen Gambling Behavior, 1 
INCREASING THE ODDS, at 4 (2009), http://www.ncrg.org/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/docs/monographs/ncrgmonographyouthforwebfinal.pdf. 
98  Grace, supra note 97. 
99  Id. 
100  See id. 
101  Stinchfield, supra note 97. 
102  Id. 
103  Randy Stinchfield & Ken C. Winters, Gambling and Problem Gambling Among 
Youths, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 172, 178 (Mar. 1998), 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/stable/ 
1049337?loginSuccess=true&seq=7#page_scan_tab_contents. 
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increased among America’s youth.104 A study found that a majority of 
adolescents across the United States reported gambling before they graduated 
high school.105 The study cited also found that “gambling participation among 
middle and high school students from 1984–1988 was 45% and increased to 
65% from 1989–2002.”106 Further, the “most popular forms of gambling among 
young people are private bets” regarding sports.107 Lastly, sports betting is one 
of the most attractive forms of gambling to young people because those bets 
involve skills with which adolescents can relate.108 
While the introduction of the internet has made it much easier for 
adolescents to gamble on sports, this should not excuse PASPA for failing to 
achieve its third and most important objective. Typically, a change in 
circumstances or factual assumptions is one factor courts determine when 
analyzing whether or not to apply the principal of stare decisis109; therefore, as 
new technology has rendered PASPA’s purpose of lowering youth gambling 
rates unworkable, PASPA should be lumped in with the rest of the bad 
precedents and overturned.110 
II. HISTORY OF NCAA V. GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY AND WHY IT IS SO 
IMPORTANT TO NEW JERSEY TO LEGALIZE SPORTS GAMBLING NATIONWIDE 
Over the past three years, New Jersey has become more and more adamant 
about nationwide legalization of sports betting.111 Why the sudden push? This 
new battle between PASPA and New Jersey is primarily due to New Jersey’s 
hurting economy, especially in Atlantic City, the gaming capital of New 
Jersey.112 New Jersey is quite aware of the potential market for sports 
gambling, considering that many Americans currently engage in the pastime 
illegally and that states are missing out on billions of potentially taxable 
                                                            
104  See Gianna Le et. al., Youth Gambling in the 21st Century: Prevalence, Impact, 
and Interventions, NAPAFASA PROBLEM GAMBLING PREVENTION TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROJECT, http://www.napafasa.org/resources/ 
PGP.Youth%20Gambling%20in%20the%2021st%20Century.pdf (last visited Sept. 
5, 2016). 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108   Id. In addition, as youth gamblers grow older, they prefer less “skill based” 
games and more games of chance, such as lotteries and slot machines. Id. 
109  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). 
110   The statistics show that PASPA’s lack of intended effect previously cited only 
furthers the argument behind PASPA’s repeal. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–5; see 
Gianna Le et. al supra note 104. 
111  See Joe Drape, New Jersey’s Effort to Legalize Sports Betting Is Denied on 
Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/sports/ 
football/new-jerseys-effort-to-legalize-sports-betting-is-denied-on-
appeal.html?_r=0. 
112  Id. 
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dollars.113 This note discusses the major reasons behind the economic recession 
within New Jersey later in this section.114 
Ironically, the opponent that continuously lobbies to stop legalized 
gambling is the professional and collegiate sporting organizations, such as the 
NFL and the NCAA.115 The irony is that these same opponents of New Jersey 
have embraced daily fantasy sports (hereinafter, “DFS”) as legal by labeling it 
a game of skill, rather than a game of chance, which is one of the defining 
elements of gambling.116 Moreover, these professional sporting organizations 
have sponsored DFS, and logos of DFS giants such as FanDuel or DraftKings 
are visible at many live sporting events.117 It is hard to see how these 
professional sporting organizations can claim that legalized sports betting will 
“‘irreparably’ corrupt sports in the United States”118 while embracing DFS, 
especially considering the new state trend to rule that DFS is illegal 
gambling.119 Many NFL teams are also starting to install “fantasy lounges,” 
which typically look like sports books within a Nevada casino.120 The irony 
also provides critics of PASPA with more ammunition, showing that the 
professional sports organizations that were the original opponents against 
sports gambling, and are New Jersey’s current opponent in NCAA v. Governor 
of New Jersey, now embrace an activity that many states are deeming illegal 
sports gambling.121 
                                                            
113  See id. (stating Americans illegally bet at least $140 billion on sports per year). 
114  See Infra Part II.B. 
115  Drape, supra note 111. 
116  David Purdum & Darren Rovell, N.Y. AG Declares DraftKings, FanDuel Are 
Illegal Gambling, Not Fantasy, ESPN (Nov. 11, 2015), http://espn.go.com/chalk/ 
story/_/id/14100780/new-york-attorney-general-declares-daily-fantasy-sports-
gambling; Drape, supra note 111. 
117  Purdum & Rovell, supra note 116 (The NBA has invested heavily in FanDuel, 
while the MLB and NHL have invested heavily in DraftKings); see also Drape, 
supra note 111 (examining the logos around the ice rink while watching hockey 
and, typically, noticing a DraftKings logo will be within view). 
118  Drape, supra note 111. 
119  Many states declared DFS illegal gambling at the time this article was written, 
including New York, Illinois, Nevada, Arizona, Iowa, and others. See Purdum & 
Rovell, supra note 116; see also Jacob Pramuk, Illinois: Daily Fantasy Sports is 
Illegal Gambling, CNBC (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/23/ 
illinois-daily-fantasy-sports-is-illegal-gambling.html; What Are The States Where 
You Can Play Daily Fantasy Sports?, LEGAL SPORTS REP., 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/daily-fantasy-sports-blocked-allowed-states/ (last 
updated Aug. 9, 2016). 
120  Drape, supra note 111. 
121  Dustin Gouker, The New Daily Fantasy Sports Bill in New York Brings Up 
PASPA Concerns, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/6650/ny-dfs-bill-and-paspa/; see supra Part I(B). 
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A. New Jersey’s Four-Year Courtroom Battle Against Professional Sports 
Organizations 
On November 28, 2011, Assemblyman John Burzichelli122 introduced a 
bill to the New Jersey Legislature that defined and established operating 
procedures for any casino that wished to have a “sports pool” within their 
premises.123 The bill is effective as law on January 17, 2012.124 The New Jersey 
Legislature also amended the New Jersey Constitution on December 8, 2011 to 
allow for sports betting at New Jersey casinos, so long as the sporting event did 
not involve a New Jersey college team and did not occur at a New Jersey 
venue.125 Soon afterwards, the five major professional sports organizations126 
filed a complaint against New Jersey, alleging that PASPA preempted New 
Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law, and therefore the New Jersey law was 
unconstitutional.127 New Jersey then filed a motion for summary judgment 
stating that the professional sports organizations did not have standing to bring 
this suit.128 
The New Jersey district court held that the professional sports 
organizations did have standing to bring this injunction.129 The court stated that 
because the New Jersey law would cause “fans’ perception of the integrity of 
[the] games [to] decline,” this was enough to create an imminent and personal 
harm to the sports organizations.130 Further, the court stated that precedent has 
held that perceived harm is enough to find standing so long as the “harm is 
based in reality.”131 The sports organizations also had three empirical studies 
that did not directly show causation but implied the negative impact of 
legalized sports gambling effects on revenue generation for sports leagues.132 
The court also held that the perceived sports organizations’ injury of lower 
match-integrity combined with the empirical studies would be traceable back to 
                                                            
122  Assemb. B. 4385, 2010 Leg., 214th sess. (N.J. 2012). 
123  N.J. REV. STAT. §5:12A-1 (2011) (repealed 2014). 
124  Id. 
125  N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (stating “It shall also be lawful for the Legislature to 
authorize by law wagering at casinos or gambling houses in Atlantic City on the 
results of any professional, college, or amateur sport or athletic event, except that 
wagering shall not be permitted on a college sport or athletic event that takes place 
in New Jersey or on a sport or athletic event in which any New Jersey college team 
participates regardless of where the event takes place”). 
126  NCAA, NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB are the five major sports organizations 
referred to as “Plaintiffs” or “the Leagues” throughout the 2012 case, NCAA v. 
Christie. NCAA v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183395 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 21, 2012). 
127  Id. at *5. 
128  Id. at *4–5. 
129  Id. at *8. 
130  Id. at *4, *9–20. 
131  Id. at *14. 
132  Id. at *15–18. 
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the implementation New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.133 Lastly, the court 
held that stopping the implementation of New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law 
would redress the alleged harms because even a small reduction in harm is 
enough to establish redressability.134 
Two months after deciding the question of standing, the court heard 
arguments regarding the constitutionality of PASPA raised by New Jersey.135 
New Jersey argued that PASPA violated the commerce clause, the Tenth 
Amendment, the due process and equal protection principals of the Fifth 
Amendment, and the equal footing doctrine.136 The professional sports 
organizations argued that PASPA is constitutional, and thus the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution preempts New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.137 
The court started its analysis by asserting that “congressional statutes are 
presumptively constitutional,” and that PASPA must be given “every 
reasonable construction” to save it from unconstitutionality; this turned out to 
be too high a burden for New Jersey to overcome.138 
In regards to New Jersey’s commerce clause argument, the district court 
held that Congress did not violate the commerce clause when it passed PASPA 
in 1992.139 The court cited Hodel v. Indiana140 to show the deferential rational 
basis standard was applied to analyze whether the law was under the commerce 
power of Congress.141 The court found Congress’ cessation of legalized sports 
gambling rationally related to the purpose of protecting the integrity of sports, 
as other states would be impacted by interstate-legalized sports betting.142 New 
Jersey also argued that the grandfather clause of PASPA violated the commerce 
clause by citing Delaware River Basin Commission v. Bucks County Water & 
Sewer Authority, a case that held a grandfather clause requires higher scrutiny 
than rational basis.143 However, the court dismissed this argument because, 
unlike the enactment of the statute in Delaware River Basin Commission, there 
were legislative findings behind PASPA’s enactment.144 Given the legislative 
history of PASPA, and given that New Jersey conceded Congress had the 
authority to regulate gambling, the district court’s holding was inevitable.145 
The court further held that New Jersey’s argument regarding the Tenth 
                                                            
133  Id. at *25–26. 
134  Id. at *26. 
135  Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d 551. 
136  Id. at 554. 
137  Id. at 556. 
138  Id. at 554, 557. 
139  See id. at 558–60. 
140  452 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1981). 
141  Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 558. 
142  Id. at 559–60. 
143  Id. at 561 (citing 641 F.2d 1087, 1098 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
144  Id. at 560–61. 
145  Id. at 558–59. 
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Amendment held no water, as PASPA did not command or require New Jersey 
to take any affirmative action at the request of the federal government.146 New 
Jersey argued that the Tenth Amendment’s language reserves to the states those 
powers not explicitly granted to the federal government in the Constitution.147 
New Jersey also argued that PASPA’s effect on the state was analogous to the 
take-title provision in New York v. United States.148 The court explained that 
historically the states gave up powers in order to establish a unitary federal 
government, and that New Jersey’s rigid idea of the Tenth Amendment was the 
type of government under the old Articles of Confederation, not the new 
Constitution.149 After discussing the history leading up to New York, the court 
announced the holding that while federal statutes could not compel the states to 
act, federal statutes could direct or motivate the states to act in a certain 
fashion.150 The court relied heavily on the fact that “compel” is defined as 
forcing states to take affirmative action, and here PASPA is not forcing any 
affirmative action but rather preventing states from taking certain action.151 
Furthermore, the court bolstered its argument by restating that the effects of 
just one state legalizing sports gambling extend outside that state and are not 
purely affecting intrastate activities; therefore, Congress has regulatory power 
to ensure that one state’s actions do not affect other states negatively.152 
Looking to the Fifth Amendment, and its Due Process Clause and implied 
Equal Protection principles,153 the court held that New Jersey is not a “person” 
and therefore the Due Process Clause does not protect it.154 However, the court 
still performed a Due Process/Equal Protection analysis, and found that PASPA 
did not involve any fundamental rights nor did it make classifications against 
protected classes of people; therefore, it was presumably valid, subject to the 
deferential rational basis review.155 Again, applying the rational basis review 
standard, the court held that PASPA was rationally related to Congress’ 
legitimate purpose of protecting the integrity of sporting events and preventing 
                                                            
146  Id. at 561–63. 
147  Id. at 561–62. 
148  Id.; 505 U.S. 144, 173–77 (1992). 
149  Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (noting ironically that one of the two 
plans considered at the Constitutional Convention was called the “New Jersey 
Plan” and is the plan that would have supported New Jersey’s idea about the tenth 
amendment). 
150  Id. at 566–67. 
151  Id. at 570. 
152  Id. at 572. 
153  The Fifth Amendment has no Equal Protection Clause per se; however, through 
reverse incorporation the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
has been read into the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–
99 (1954). 
154  Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 574. 
155  Id. at 574–75. 
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the spread of sports gambling.156 
New Jersey’s “Equal Footing” argument also failed as the court stated that 
New Jersey was not “either attempting to enter the Union or one that [was] 
recently admitted to the Union.”157 After determining that PASPA is 
constitutional, the Court granted a permanent injunction for the professional 
sports organizations against New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.158 New Jersey 
appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling regarding 
standing, constitutional issues, and the granting of an injunction, stating that 
Congress, not the courts, must be the one to alter PASPA’s effect on the 
states.159 New Jersey attempted to appeal to the United States Supreme Court in 
2014 but the Court did not grant writ of certiorari to hear the case.160 
However, New Jersey would not stop there, doubtless determined to bring 
a new source of revenue to their downtrodden economy. New Jersey partially 
repealed its Sports Wagering Law on October 17, 2014, which was the subject 
of the 2012 litigation, by removing state prohibitions, permits, and licensing 
requirements with the help of the severability clause contained within the 2012 
law.161 By repealing these state requirements, the 2014 law essentially allowed 
only casinos and racetracks to offer sports wagering.162 
New Jersey argued that they were simply complying with PASPA’s 
language, that a state may not “authorize, sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, 
or license sports betting.”163 Because the 2014 law repealed the licensing 
requirements and removed sports betting from state supervision, New Jersey 
argued that they are not attempting to circumvent PASPA.164 Further, New 
Jersey argued that they are complying with the Third Circuit’s decision in the 
prior case by citing court language that PASPA does not “prohibit New Jersey 
from repealing its ban on sports wagering,” and that the states can decide “the 
exact contours of the prohibition[s]” regarding sports wagering.165 However, 
                                                            
156  Id. at 575–76. 
157  Id. at 577. 
158  Id. at 577, 579. 
159  Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2013). 
160  Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S.Ct. 2866 (2014). 
161  Bob Jordan & Steve Edelson, Gov. Christie Signs New Jersey Sports Betting 
Bill into Law, USA TODAY (Oct. 17, 2014, 6:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/sports/2014/10/17/chris-christie-signs-bill-allowing-sports-betting-new-
jersey/17457177/; see also N.J. REV. STAT. §5:12A-1 (2011) (repealed 2014). 
162  Will Hobson, Everything You Need to Know About New Jersey’s Pending 
High-Stakes Sports Gambling Ruling, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/ 07/01/everything-you-
need-to-know-about-new-jerseys-pending-high-stakes-sports-gambling-ruling/. 
163  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164  Id. (pointing out the similarity between the court’s ruling about the legalization 
of sports betting and other courts’ rulings, such as Colorado and Washington, about 
the legalization of marijuana). 
165  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie (Christie II Dist. Ct.), 61 F. Supp. 3d 
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the five major professional sports organizations disagreed and argued that 
permitting sports betting in state-licensed casinos and racetracks is state 
licensing and state authorization,166 and therefore the sports organizations again 
sought an injunction against New Jersey and the new 2014 law.167 
This time, District Judge Shipp168 analyzed only New Jersey’s partial 
repeal in the context of the Third Circuit’s previous ruling, rather than the 
constitutionality of PASPA, which had already been decided.169 The court 
examined the Third Circuit’s language, which ultimately described “two 
choices” that PASPA provides to the states: either repeal the sports wagering 
ban or keep a complete ban on sports wagering and enforce it as they see fit.170 
After another preemption analysis, federal legislative history review, and state 
legislative history review, the district court held that PASPA preempted the 
2014 partial repeal law.171 The court sided with the sports organizations, stating 
that anything beyond either a full repeal or a complete ban on sports wagering 
would give states too much power to circumvent the federal government.172 
The court further stated that the 2014 partial repeal had the same effect as the 
2012 law previously struck down.173 The court again permanently enjoined 
New Jersey from violating PASPA with its 2014 partial repeal.174 
New Jersey again appealed the district court’s ruling to the Third Circuit 
and the Third Circuit again upheld the lower court’s ruling because the 2014 
partial repeal essentially authorized sports wagering.175 The Third Circuit 
acknowledged that PASPA was not without its critics and that New Jersey 
faced economic hardships, but the court echoed that states cannot undo federal 
laws whenever they see fit.176 
However, good news exists for New Jersey, as the Third Circuit has 
recently vacated its decision regarding the 2014 partial repeal and granted a 
rehearing en banc.177 This is a rare occurrence because a majority of the active 
judges who signed the order must have voted to rehear the case; this shows the 
need to readdress some of the major issues behind the litigation.178 The Third 
                                                            
488, 495 (2014). 
166  Hobson, supra note 162. 
167  Christie II Dist. Ct., 61 F. Supp. 3d 488. 
168  Judge Shipp was the Judge on the original Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Christie suit as well. See Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d 551. 
169  Christie II Dist. Ct., 61 F. Supp. 3d at 498. 
170  Id. at 500. 
171  Id. at 503–06. 
172  Id. at 504. 
173  Id. at 505. 
174  Id. at 507–08. 
175  Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2015) (decision vacated 2015). 
176  Id. at 265 (citing to Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
177  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839, *7–8 
(3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015). 
178  Drape, supra note 17. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals reheard the case on February 17, 2016.179 
B. Why is New Jersey So Adamant on Legalizing Sports Wagering Nationally? 
Since the nationwide economic recession in the late 2000s, New Jersey is 
one of the few states that has increasing poverty rates, unlike many other 
states.180 While the United States as a whole has recovered 132% of jobs lost 
during the recession, New Jersey’s economy has only recovered 62% of jobs 
lost.181 New Jersey’s job growth rate was also the lowest in the contiguous 
United States from 2013–2014.182 Further, New Jersey’s economic growth in 
2014 ranked 46 out of all 50 states, with an unemployment rate well above the 
national average.183 The downtrodden economy is also uncommon to the 
regional Northeast, as neighboring states, such as New York and Pennsylvania, 
have bounced back since the recession.184 
New Jersey’s Atlantic City gaming industry was hit exceptionally hard 
since the recession and continues to flounder economically.185 This is bad news 
for Atlantic City, whose economy brings in two-thirds of its revenue through 
gambling and only one-third from non-gambling revenue sources.186 Further, 
since 2006, gaming revenue has dropped from $5.2 billion to $2.7 billion.187 In 
fact, in 2014, six years after the recession, four casinos had closed and over 
8,000 workers lost their jobs in the gaming industry.188 The four casinos to 
close were the Atlantic Club, the Showboat, the Revel (which was supposed to 
bring back Atlantic City’s gaming industry), and the Trump Plaza.189 Those 
four closures caused Atlantic City’s tax base to drop more than $13 billion in 
property taxes; in 2013, before the closures, all the casinos in Atlantic City 
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provided 70% of annual property taxes within the city.190 One of the major 
reasons behind Atlantic City’s decline has been the loss of the city’s monopoly 
on legalized gambling in the East Coast region.191 
With gambling available in other neighboring states such as New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Delaware, the gaming industry in Atlantic City has been 
“cannibalized” by these new casinos.192 The first casino in Atlantic City opened 
in 1978; however, in 1996 Delaware provided some competition by opening 
three slot venues.193 Pennsylvania then opened its first casino in 2006 and 
added more casinos yearly.194 In fact, by 2011, thirteen casinos had opened up 
in Pennsylvania and Delaware, with three more proposed to open; moreover, 
these numbers do not include the casinos that opened in either Maryland or 
New York.195 By adding table games in 2010, both Delaware and Pennsylvania 
had destroyed New Jersey’s monopoly.196 
Studies also show that the introduction of these table games and casinos in 
New Jersey’s neighboring states has had a positive economic impact within 
those states while eroding Atlantic City’s casino industry.197 Further, 
“[a]pproximately $1,262 less is gambled every month in Delaware, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania with the addition of each Pennsylvania slot machine,” 
showing a negative effect of adjacent state casinos.198 This is likely because 
Atlantic City no longer has a gambling monopoly in the Northeast, causing 
many people from neighboring states to now play locally rather than travel out 
of state to gamble.199 A 2005 study supports this point, finding that nearly 64% 
of people visiting New Jersey casinos were residents of a different state.200 
Further, even more casinos are expected to open within the next few years 
in Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, further saturating 
the gambling market and taking more money away from New Jersey.201 Some 
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predict these new casinos may cause the closure of more Atlantic City casinos, 
which would likely increase New Jersey’s unemployment rate even more.202 
However, if New Jersey were able to legalize sports betting, it is possible that 
this change would result in an increase of new jobs as well as potentially help 
the already downtrodden economy with another revenue source.203 Legalizing 
sports betting would help take some of the $3.8 billion dollars bet illegally on 
the Super Bowl, for example, and turn it into taxable revenue for states such as 
New Jersey,204 but how would this affect Las Vegas’ monopoly on sports 
betting? 
III. NEVADA WILL LIKELY FEEL NEGATIVE ECONOMIC EFFECTS FROM 
LEGALIZED SPORTS GAMBLING IN NEIGHBORING STATES 
It is common sense that anytime a business loses a monopoly in an 
industry, the increase in competition hurts that business’s bottom line.205 A 
monopoly realizes a super-normal profit during its monopoly status; however, 
the monopoly owner feels more competition as more players enter the market 
because the monopoly owner can no longer set the prices as she sees fit due to 
the new players offering the same product at lower prices.206 Therefore, the 
once-monopoly owner must lower prices in order to compete with the new 
competition prices or else lose large amounts of business to the rival 
companies.207 
Let us look at the only other real player in the sports betting market besides 
Nevada—Delaware; unlike Nevada, which allows betting on any sporting event 
in any fashion, Delaware runs a “sports lottery,” which allows players to place 
parlay wagers on professional football games only.208 The parlay bets in 
Delaware require gamblers to bet on the outcome of at least three games and 
require them to guess all three outcomes correctly in order to win.209 As of 
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2016, 102 sports retailers accepted wagers on Delaware’s NFL parlay bets.210 
The total of NFL parlay sales reached $37.9 million dollars in 2014–15, up 
more than 300% since its inception in 2009–2010.211 
Delaware’s increase every year in NFL parlay sales is likely due to the fact 
it too has an unique monopoly on sports betting: it is the only place where 
limited legal sports wagering exists east of the Mississippi river.212 This helps 
Delaware compete in an already over-saturated market in the Northeast 
concerning the large amounts of casinos in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Maryland.213 In fact, although there is no exact count of how many people 
travel to Delaware from neighboring states because of Delaware’s sports 
betting, the influx of citizens from neighboring states has been “significant,” 
especially to the Delaware sports lottery participants on the border of Maryland 
and Pennsylvania.214 Given that Delaware has one of the smaller populations in 
the United States at 935,614 people in 2014,215 it is even more likely that a 
population base of that size, which includes all ages of persons, cannot produce 
the entire $37.9 million in sales recorded in 2014.216 
Delaware’s main limitation is that it only allows legal sports betting in the 
form of NFL parlay bets, and an examination of Nevada, the only state to allow 
all sports betting in any form, exhibits that limitation.217 Nevada’s 196 total 
sports books received total bets in 2015 on all sports amounting to about $4.24 
billion.218 This led to Nevada’s sports books profiting approximately $231.8 
million for the 2015 year.219 This pure profit associated with sports wagering 
only has nearly doubled since the year 2000.220 For an even closer analogy, 
compare Nevada’s sports book profit from the NFL alone to Delaware’s profit 
for 2015. Nevada sports books profited $82.5 million in 2015 from NFL 
bets,221 while Delaware profited $13.9 million in 2015 from their NFL parlay 
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system.222 In 2015, while Delaware received approximately $7 million in 
taxable revenue from sports wagering,223 Nevada sports wagering alone 
generated approximately $18 million in taxes.224 
While a comparison between the two states does not exactly produce 
evidence that the two states are exactly alike, it can help identify some of the 
similarities, which will lead to why Nevada likely will lose revenue if sports 
betting becomes legalized across the country. First, while the population of 
Nevada was 2,839,099 people in 2014,225 only slightly above 3 times the 
population of Delaware, its sports books received more than 111 times the bets 
than Delaware’s sports books.226 The next logical step is to think, “Well, so 
what? Delaware is not the tourist destination that Nevada is.” This is quite true, 
as Delaware pulled in 8 million visitors in 2014227 while Nevada attracted 
approximately 7 times as many, receiving over 52 million visitors in 2014.228 It 
also is important to note that both Delaware’s and Nevada’s per capita income 
for 2014 are similar at $30,191 and $26,515, respectively.229 
While, logically, not every one of those visitors came to Delaware or 
Nevada to gamble, let alone bet on sports, some of these visitors likely did. 
While scarce, some statistics exist as to who visits Nevada and the purposes 
behind their visit. In 2009, estimates show that 35% of the visitors who came to 
Las Vegas were from California.230 In fact, approximately 25.3 million people 
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entered Nevada by vehicle in 2012, almost half of the near 51.6 million total 
visitor volume for that year.231 This makes sense because when one looks at a 
map of Nevada, Las Vegas and Reno are less than 100 miles from Arizona and 
California, with Lake Tahoe touching the California border.232 
Further, the American Gaming Association (AGA) states that legalized 
sports wagering “helps bring in more than 30 million visitors to Nevada each 
year.”233 While this estimate seems a little high, as it is more than 50% of the 
tourists for the year of 2014, when examined in light of the fact that 35% of 
tourists to Las Vegas come from California—which would approximate to 
about 18.2 million in 2014—it seems a safe bet to estimate that at least 10 
million visitors to Nevada annually are likely extremely interested in placing a 
sports wager.234 Further, the AGA states that many tourists visit Nevada in 
February and March to place bets legally on the Super Bowl and the NCAA 
Men’s Basketball Tournament, respectively.235 
Out of the total Nevada statewide non-restricted licensee gaming revenue, 
4.11 billion was from table games and the sports book, while 7 billion came 
from slot machines.236 Out of this 4.11 billion, sports betting pulled in the fifth 
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highest revenue from any non-slot casino game statewide, making up 5.64% of 
the total non-slot gaming revenue for casinos in Nevada.237 It consistently was 
the fifth highest grossing non-slot game in Clark County comprising 5.3% of 
all non-slot revenue.238 However, when considering both table games and slot 
revenue, sports wagering only makes up 2.1% of total casino gaming 
revenue.239 
While 2.1% of total casino gaming revenue may seem insignificant, 
remember that 2.1% still equals about $232 million, which will never be an 
insignificant amount to a state obtaining about 25% of its taxes through gaming 
revenue tax.240 The state’s ability to draw such a large percentage of taxes from 
the gaming industry helps put less of a burden on its citizens, offering the third 
best business tax climate in the country and ranking 49th out of 51 states (D.C. 
included) in tax burdens on its residents.241 If sports betting were legalized 
nationwide, this $232 million in taxable casino sports book revenue likely 
would decrease, putting more of a tax burden on society and forcing the state to 
look elsewhere for these funds. 
Although the argument exists that Las Vegas itself is enough of a tourist-
draw to endure the potential losses in sports wagering, there are other towns 
that rely on gaming revenue, such as Reno and Lake Tahoe.242 Lake Tahoe and 
Reno both experienced gross gaming revenue declines from 1990–2010.243 
These two cities experienced further gaming revenue decline of about 32% in 
Lake Tahoe and 20% in Reno from 2008–2013.244 Lake Tahoe recently added a 
new casino, the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino, to attempt to bolster its gaming 
economy.245 However, the opening of a single tribal casino in California is a 
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primary reason for the major declines in these two Nevada gaming regions.246 
The fact that opening a single tribal casino in California, not far from Lake 
Tahoe and Reno, affected these regions this harshly shows how quickly the 
gaming market can change in Nevada. One can also analogize this casino-
cannibalization phenomenon to sports wagering—Reno and Lake Tahoe lost 
their monopoly when a tribal casino popped up nearby; if sports betting 
becomes legal nationwide and California or Arizona implement sports 
wagering, it is likely that Nevada will see a large decrease in sports wagering, 
especially during big events like the SuperBowl or March Madness. This is 
because people from neighboring states would no longer have to drive to either 
Las Vegas or Reno, but rather could legally place these bets in their own 
backyard. 
Further, while Las Vegas consistently reinvents itself, it is seeing less and 
less revenue generated from its slots than ever before because the millennial 
generation does not prefer slot machine wagering.247 The average age of 
visitors to Las Vegas has gotten younger since 2008.248 This is because the 
Millennial Generation, also sometimes referred to as Gen Y, is 21–34 years old, 
and is now one of the largest demographic groups in America.249 Millennials 
are typically better educated than other generations, use their cell phones for 
their main source of entertainment, and prefer to spend money on experiences 
rather than gambling.250 Millennials enjoy games of skill, such as blackjack, 
daily fantasy sports, and e-sports, more than slots.251 This has led casino 
executives to try new skill-based slot machines resembling video games in an 
attempt to attract this young group to become the biggest revenue producer in 
the casino.252 
Because sports wagering is a game of skill, and because the new generation 
spends less on slot machines, sports wagering may become even more 
important to casino revenue than it is today. If this is the case, Nevada may 
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want to find a way to keep its monopoly in the sports wagering market because 
if it loses this unique draw, it may lose one more option that Millennials come 
to Nevada to enjoy. Further, the younger generation is even more into sports, 
which is visible through their high interest in daily fantasy sports and e-sports, 
making the sports wagering market an even more precious asset to Nevada. 
While Las Vegas has always had the customer base and appeal to bring in 
tourism, other resorts such as Lake Tahoe and Reno may need the sports 
wagering monopoly to keep their business afloat. If sports wagering does 
become legal nationwide, it could cause thousands of people to lose their jobs 
within Nevada because less-prominent border casinos near Arizona and 
California will likely lose significant revenue from their sports books. While 
losing 2% of a business does not sound like a lot, it is enough to take notice of 
New Jersey’s attempt to legalize sports wagering, and Nevada should prepare 
itself for any potential changes to its major industry. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
PASPA has not accomplished the purposes behind its enactment. Sports 
wagering is more prevalent than ever, the integrity of sports is still questioned 
today, and America’s youth still engages in illegal gambling. While New Jersey 
fights its five-year-long court battle, win or lose, Americans are calling for the 
legalization of sports betting in the U.S. Further, because people nationwide 
question PASPA’s constitutionality, and it failed to prevent the spread of sports 
betting, it is unlikely to remain good law for long. 
This should cause Nevada some alarm. While Nevada’s sports book 
revenue only makes up approximately 2–3% of its total gaming intake, this is 
still hundreds of millions of dollars in taxable revenue. Nevada losing its 
monopoly on sports betting could cause towns that already have trouble 
competing with neighboring state casinos, such as Lake Tahoe and Reno, to 
feel an even worse economic impact. While Las Vegas will always have its 
draw and charm to an international customer base, the loss of sports books in 
other parts of Nevada could lead to a loss of jobs and an increase in tax burden 
on people. For these reasons, Nevada should start to prepare itself for the 
inevitable—the legalization of nationwide sports betting. 
